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THE UNRULINESS OF RULES 
Peter A. Alces* 
THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, & THE DILEMMAS OF 
LAW. By Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin. Durham: Duke Univer­
sity Press. 2001. Pp. viii, 279. $45.95. 
Analytical jurisprudence1 depends on a posited relation between 
rules and morality. Before we may answer persistent and important 
questions of legal theory - indeed, before we can even know what 
those questions are - we must understand not just the operation of 
rules but their operation in relation to morality. Once that relationship 
is formulated, we may then come to terms with the likes of inductive 
reasoning in Law, the role of precedent, and the fit, such as it is, 
between Natural Law and Positivism as well as even the coincidence 
(or lack thereof) between inclusive and exclusive positivism. That is 
the thesis of The Rule of Rules ("Rules"). 
Professors Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin of the University 
of San Diego School of Law have written what would be (and what 
may be) a prolegomenon.2 They use the rules-morality duality to 
reveal a cleavage in the Law that could intimate the ultimate moral 
impossibility of Law. So their critique is comprehensive. The cleavage, 
* Rita Anne Rollins Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary School of Law. 
AB. 1977, Lafayette; J.D. 1980, University of Illinois. - Ed. I am indebted to James Dwyer 
and Jay Mootz for helpful comments on prior drafts of this Review and to those who 
attended a faculty colloquium at The College of William and Mary School of Law. 
1. "[A]nalytical jurisprudence . . .  is concerned with the clarification of the general 
framework of legal thought, rather than with the criticism of law and legal policy." H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW vii (1961). That observation, though, could not completely 
divorce the analytical from the critical. Certainly the conclusions of those who would deter­
mine, as an analytical matter, the nature of Law-morality relation necessarily resonate with 
the critical conclusions concerning the proper sources of adjudicative rules, particularly, and 
not incidentally, the moral integrity of reliance on precedent as a form of inductive reason­
ing. See Colloquy, Against Legal Principles, 82 IOWA L. REV. 739 (1997) (an issue devoted to 
Larry Alexander and Ken Kress's argument, in Against Legal Principles, and several re­
sponses to their thesis). 
2. Several chapters of Rules have substantially and previously appeared as published law 
review articles. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Are Procedural Rights Derivative Substantive 
Rights?, 17 LAW & PHIL. 19 (1998); Larry Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 517 (1998); Larry Alexander, "With Me, It's All er Nuthin' ": 
Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530 (1999) [hereinafter Alexander, 
Formalism in Law and Morality]; Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in 
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (1999). But the book is not just a collection of those earlier 
essays; it is a new synthesis of ideas, some of which have been presented in less comprehen­
sive form in those earlier works. 
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or "gap," they identify is a function of rules' operation as the bases of 
authoritative settlement and it is authoritative settlement that 
responds to what a primitive, prelegal, community lacks.3 
An account of Rules's contribution must engage the authors' 
conception of the rules-morality tension because that tension provides 
the lens through which the authors build a jurisprudence, or at least a 
jurisprudential perspective. This Review considers the cogency of their 
conclusions if they have posited the rules-morality tension accurately 
and asks some of the questions required to determine whether their 
formulation can support the weight they would impose on it. 
Part I of this Review offers a critical synopsis of Rules, summarily 
presenting the book's argument and challenging particular elabora­
tions and applications of the thesis. Part II, more fundamentally, 
considers the nature of the morality metric. The question is not what 
particular moral system - Natural Law,4 categorical imperative,5 or 
consequentialist,6 for example - best supports rules particularly or 
generally, but, instead, how must we conceive of the nature of the 
moral inquiry, and the relationship between morality and rules, in 
3.  P. 25. Alexander and Sherwin reproduce Hart's understanding of the need for 
authoritative settlement: 
[I]f doubts arise as to what the rules are or as to the precise scope of some given rule, there 
will be no procedure for settling this doubt, either by reference to an authoritative text or to 
an official whose declarations on this point are authoritative. For, plainly, such a procedure 
and the acknowledgment of either authoritative text or persons involve the existence of rules 
of a type different from the rules of obligation or duty which ex hypothesi are all that the 
group has. This defect in the simple social structure of primary rules we may call its uncer­
tainty. 
P. 22 (citing HART, supra note 1, at 90). 
4. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). Neil 
MacCormick has fixed the place of Finnis's contribution to the Natural Law firmament as a: 
book which for British scholars has brought back to life the classical Thomistic/ Arisotelian 
theory of natural law. A theory which more than one generation of thinkers had dismissed as 
an ancient and exploded fallacy kept alive only as the theological dogmatics of an authori­
tarian church was rescued from a whole complex of misunderstandings and misrepresenta­
tions. 
Neil MacCormick, Nalllral Law and the Separation of Law and Morals, in NATURAL LAW 
THEORY 105 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). Natural Law also has its secular dimension and 
adherents. Michael S. Moore's Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2424 (1992) for­
mulates a secular Natural Law perspective from "supervenience-naturalist, nonfoundation­
alist, externalist, bivalent, antinominalist as well as anti-idealist" morally realistic premises. 
Id. at 2450. 
5. "Act according to a maxim which can be adopted at the same time as a Universal 
Law." IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 34 (W. Hastie ed., 1 887). 
6. By "consequentialist" I intend to include utilitarian theories, such as the normative 
perspective of welfare economics as conceived by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell in Fair­
ness Versus Welfare, 1 14 HARV. L. REV. 961, 979 (2001): "Under welfare economics, norma­
tive evaluations are based on the well-being of individuals. Economists often use the term 
'utility' to refer to the well-being of an individual, and, when there is uncertainty about fu­
ture events, economists use an ex ante measurement of well-being, 'expected utility.' " 
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order to reach conclusions about the incidents of Law and legal 
analysis. 
This Review argues that we need to formulate the nature of the 
moral inquiry before we can either appraise the fit between rules and 
morality or posit the discontinuity of rules and morality and the 
concomitant impossibility of Law. Rules, then, are ultimately unruly 
because when we understand rules as an elaboration of morality, 
we understand rules as relying on· a foundation - morality - the 
substantiality of which analytical jurisprudence has not yet devised the 
means to appraise or even to take sufficient stock of. 
I. RULES IN CONTEXT 
H.L.A. Hart recognized the challenge confronting the next analytic 
jurisprude in his monumental The Concept of Law: "I hope that [the 
form of presentation pursued in Concept] may discourage the belief 
that a book on legal theory is primarily a book from which one learns 
what other books contain."7 Though the contemporary genre -
analytical jurisprudence - can claim a provenance tracing at least 
back to Austin,8 it would be inaccurate to suggest that the analytical 
inquiry pursued by Alexander and Sherwin is merely responsive. 
While the authors do present a thesis dependent on the terms of their 
response to positivist discoveries in analytical jurisprudence, they also 
formulate the consequences for broader, jurisprudential conclusions 
and recognize the significance of those contributions. A brief summary 
of the path of the book's argument accommodates focus on the foun­
dation of the authors' thesis. 
7. See HART, supra note 1, at viii; see also MICHAEL S. MOORE, EDUCATING ONESELF 
IN PUBLIC vii (2000) (acknowledging that "[t]he late Herbert Hart once wrote that jurispru­
dence has too often been about what other books have said") .
. 
8. Hart wrote in response to Professor J.L. Austin's "command " theory of Law. That 
theory was captured, according to Hart, in Austin's THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE 
DETERMINED (Noonday Press 1954) (1832) and LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW (London, John Murray 1885). See HART, supra note 1, at 
18-19. Actually, the particular animating tension between Law, as elaborated in rules, and 
Equity was recognized in Aristotelian ethics: 
[A ]11 law is universal, and there are some things about which one cannot speak correctly in 
universal terms. In those areas, then, in which it is necessary to make universal statements 
but it is not possible to do so correctly, the law takes account of what happens more often, 
though it is not unaware that it can be in error. And it is no less correct for doing this: for the 
error is attributable not to the law, nor to the law-giver, but to the nature of the case, since 
the subject-matter of action is like this in its essence. 
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 100 (Roger Crisp trans. & ed., 2000). That excerpt con­
templates a cleavage between Law and morality and in doing so formulates, at least implic­
itly, a linear conception of the morality metric, about which more will be said below. See 
infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text. Dean (then Professor) Heidi Hurd used a portion 
of that excerpt from another translation of the Nicomachean Ethics as the frontispiece of her 
Moral Combat. See HEIDI M. HURD, MORAL COMBAT (1999). 
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Appreciated as constraints on reasoning, rules circumscribe the 
operation of Reason in ways that facilitate corporate and coordinated 
action, though imperfectly: 
The result is a practical paradox. Reason requires resort to Will, but Will 
can never capture Reason. The paradox lies at the heart of law. It sur­
faces not only in the perennial clash of jurisprudential titans, natural law 
(Reason) and legal positivism (Will), but also in puzzlings over interpre­
tation, precedent, legal reasoning, and many other jurisprudential mat­
ters, as well as in controversies about legal doctrine, which are replete 
with synchronic and diachronic clashes of reason and Will. (p. 8) 
From this premise, Alexander and Sherwin proceed to describe the 
role of rules in authoritative settlement. The first part of Rules, "The 
Circumstance of Law," describes how rules provide the means for a 
community to settle authoritatively moral disagreements. Once estab­
lished, the rules "supplant the reasons upon which they are based."9 
In Chapter One, the authors survey the benefits of such authorita­
tive settlement and reveal the problems it may create. Rules are simul­
taneously the means of a community's achieving authoritative settle­
ment and the source of resulting complications. In the course of 
reconciling authoritative settlement and the circumstance of Law, 
Alexander and Sherwin consider the contributions of Hart and reflect 
on the fit between their conclusions and Hart's observations. 
Ultimately, they conclude, "although Hart does identify problems that 
would plague his imagined primitive community, these problems are 
all aspects of a single problem, namely, the absence of authoritative 
settlement by means of rules" (p. 24). 
Chapter Two considers in greater depth the nature of authoritative 
rules that determine the circumstance of Law in the community, and, 
in so doing, distinguishes among the different types of rules that 
inform behavior and establish the coordination of normative consid­
erations. Alexander and Sherwin distinguish "rules" from "norms" 
and "standards" in terms that accommodate a taxonomy of authorita­
tive settlement. For example: "The quality that identifies a rule and 
distinguishes it from a standard is the quality of determinateness. A 
norm becomes a rule when most people understand it in a similar 
way."10 Those premises support the authors' concl usions regarding the 
9. P. 13 (citing JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 24-25, 30-33 (1979); Joseph Raz, 
Awhority and Justification� 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1985); and Joseph Raz, Authority, Law 
and Morality. 68 MONIST 295 (1985)). 
10. P. 30. The relation between rules and norms is also crucial in our appreciating the 
nature of morality as a foundation of rules. See infra note 11. At this point in Chapter Two, 
Alexander and Sherwin recognize that rules and standards describe points on a generality­
determinateness continuum: "Although a standard is transparent to background moral prin­
ciples and requires particularist decision-making, rules can be applied without regard to 
questions of background morality. " P. 30; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" 
as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 49 (1997) (" '[R]ules' and 
'standards' do not so much define a dichotomy as reflect a range along a continuum. "). 
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role of rules in terms of coordination, expertise, and efficiency. At this 
point, the authors examine the "built-in imperfection of rules" 
and take account of Frederick Schauer's description of rules as 
"entrenched generalizations. "11 
In their third chapter, Alexander and Sherwin discuss the 
"Hierarchies of Rules." They investigate the moral function of rules in 
terms of the authoritative settlement requisite, and find, "the morally 
best rules on which agreement can be· obtained are in some sense the 
morally best rules" (p. 42). They then treat what they term rule 
"pathologies" - misinterpretation, revolution, and fragmentation. 
Part II concerns "Acting Under Rules." Chapters Four and Five 
examine the dilemma of the rational moral actor confronted with a 
rule whose prescription is inconsistent with the actor's appraisal of the 
circumstance she confronts. 
In Chapter Four, the authors treat the "gap" between the 
lawgiver's (Lex's) reasons for promulgating a rule and the subject's 
reasons for action. The gap is a persistent irritant that focuses the 
inquiry on the role of rules and challenges jurisprudential perspectives 
that endeavor to take account of the rules' operation. This portion of 
the study affords Alexander and Sherwin an opportunity to confront 
the conclusions of Schauer and others regarding the responsibility of 
the moral actor to afford rules some, albeit not absolute, deference. 
Rules function, we are reminded, "to translate moral principles into a 
set of directions that can be understood by people who previously dis­
agreed or were uncertain about the meaning of those principles" (p. 
54). 
So the moral failure of rules, then, may merely be the failure of 
information or calculation. Indeed, another way to depict the rules-
1 1 . P. 35. It is worthwhile to reproduce Schauer here, in pertinent part: 
Entrenchment makes the properties suppressed by generalization less subject to recall on 
demand, and entrenched generalizations mould our imagination and apprehension in such a 
way that methods of thinking that would focus on different properties become comparatively 
inaccessible . . . .  
To the extent that generalizations become entrenched, the inclusions of past generalizations 
facilitate dealing with the future when it is like the past, but the suppressions of past gener­
alizations impede dealing with the future when that future departs from our prior expecta­
tions. 
FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 43 (1991). It seems to me that there is 
an aspect of Schauer's "entrenchment" that may be suppressed by Alexander and Sherwin's 
invocation of it. Rules do not channel thought simpliciter; they change the way we think 
about problems, the way we make choices - they "mould our imagination." Insofar as the 
moral measure of our actions may be determined by reference to the imagination we impose 
on choice, rules as facts can shift the moral firmament, just as Law and norms are in symbi­
otic tension. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 1649, 1651 n.2 (2000) ("By 'expressive function of law' and (for short)·'expressive law,' 
I refer to the positive claim that law influences behavior independently of its sanctions. "). 
We can go further: Law not only influences behavior, Law is influenced by behavior; further, 
Law influences thought just as thought influences Law. 
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morality tension would be to understand morality as fully elaborated 
guides to action. A sense of rules as conceptions emerges; and concep­
tions rely, perhaps tautologically, on concepts that operate at a level of 
abstraction. It is a tautology to assert that the abstraction cleavage 
may be discontinuous with the constituents of fit between rules and 
morality; there is morality in the cleavage. 
Chapter Five formulates the interpretation of rules and investi­
gates at length the fit between the lawgiver's intentions and the 
subject's disposition to order her affairs in a manner consistent with 
those intentions. That requires, of course, a means to discern the law­
giver's intent and to appraise the subject's actions. Here the authors 
respond to Lawrence Lessig's analysis of these issues12 and to the 
concl usions of Saul Kripke on Ludwig Wittgenstein.13 
12. Pp. 107-12. Alexander and Sherwin respond specifically to Lessig's equation of 
interpretation and translation in the case of rule interpretation in circumstances not within 
the contemplation of the legislator. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. 
REV. 1165 (1993). Their response to Lessig answers the question that the authors pose about 
interpretation generally: "[I)s there in fact something Lex intends to prescribe for his sub­
jects in those cases not actually contemplated by Lex when he issues his rule? Put differently, 
does Lex have an intention regarding what ought to be done in cases not before his mind 
when he communicates? " P. 100. It  may be that Alexander and Sherwin conflate two aspects 
of Lex's inchoate intent here. When Lex legislates, his object is both to determine results 
and to determine the process by which results are achieved. That is not just to say that Lex is 
fixing both substantive and procedural law. He is doing more. He is formulating rules in a 
manner cognizant of adjudication and rule-following behaviors. 
Consider an analogy: when you throw a ball to a receiver you "lead" her, so that the ball 
will arrive at her hands at the desired location (i.e., at or past the first down marker). If you 
throw the ball to the point where the receiver is at the moment you release it, the ball will be 
thrown behind the receiver and she will likely not catch it; indeed, it may well be inter­
cepted. Similarly, those who promulgate authoritative rules "throw" them in a manner that 
anticipates the fit between morality and the rule (in light of whatever factors may determine 
movement in that fit). Indeed, the thrower (Lex) may "put some air under the ball " to permit 
the receiver (the adjudicator) to adjust as necessary to the ball (the rule) in order to assure a 
reception, the best fit between the rule and morality. Too limited a conception of the rule­
morality fit will obscure the community's reliance on Lex's prescience. 
Alexander and Sherwin seem to appreciate the problem revealed in the foregoing 
analogy: "[!Jn interpreting Lex's rules, what 'ls the role of rules or norms of interpretation 
that come, not from Lex, but from the basic agreement constituting Lex as authoritative for 
what ought to be done?" P. 100. So could we find in that agreement some license for inter­
pretation that would account for the adjudicator's role as custodian of the rule-morality fit? 
Alexander and Sherwin seem to think not: 
It is possible that a community would also adopt preconstitutional norms holding that Lex's 
rules should be "interpreted" to avoid results that are seriously unjust or absurd. For a 
community interested in settlement of moral controversy, however. norms of this kind seem 
inadvisable. If Michael (the adjudicator] measures each application of Lex's rules against a 
standard of justice (which presumably is the ultimate end of the body of rules) or absurdity 
(meaning moral absurdity), the rules are no longer capable of settling moral controversy. In­
stead. the controversy is reopened in the process of assigning meanings to the rules. The 
principal difference is that settlement authority shifts from Lex to Michael, who was not the 
community's first choice to serve as moral decision-maker. It seems preferable, therefore, 
that moral absurdity and injustice should not supplant, but should serve only as evidence 
bearing on, Lex's intended meaning. 
P. 121. It may be that if we relax Alexander and Sherwin's assumption about the nature of 
morality's relation to rules, or at least admit of the possibility that Lex is not clairvoyant and 
that Lex recognizes that deficiency in himself, the constituting authority might prefer a 
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Part III of Rules surveys "Issues of Legal Reasoning" and begins in 
Chapter Six with an investigation of "Reasoning by Analogy." The 
authors offer a "qualified" defense of analogical reasoning in terms of 
the competence of different actors to make rules and conclude, "if 
analogical reasoning is justified at all, it is justified on second-best 
grounds, much like those that support Lex's use of rules" (p. 134). 
They find, " [t]here is nothing in the nature of prior decisions to ensure 
that analogical reasoning based on those decisions will have advan­
tages of the kind associated with rules" (p. 131). 
Chapter Seven addresses "Precedent," and proceeds from the 
judgment that " [t]he authority of precedents becomes important only 
when judges think the precedents are wrong" (p. 137). That perspec­
tive supports the authors' analysis of three models of precedent (the 
"Natural "14 "Rule "15 and "Result"16 models) and ultimately the 
' ' ' ' 
authors' despair that many of the uses of precedent as a means to 
determine the scope of rules are deficient. The analysis here requires 
that Alexander and Sherwin formulate the role of different actors in 
the rule-applying scheme and offers important conclusions about the 
relative fitness of those actors to coordinate their actions to maintain 
the normative integrity of rules.17 
Chapter Eight confronts Ronald Dworkin's account of legal 
principles.18 Alexander and Sherwin consider alternative subdivisions 
of legal norms in order to respond to Dworkin's conception of the role 
and function of "legal principle." They read Benjamin Cardozo's 
Michael in situ to Lex on high. Indeed, Lex might conclude, as the omniscient moral agent 
that he is, that he needs to leave some air under his rules. All of that does depend on our 
conception of the nature of the rules-morality relation though, and may not come into focus 
until we formulate that relation more clearly. What is important now is that we appreciate 
that Alexander and Sherwin's conclusion about the limits of "interpretation " - or the op­
eration of supplements to interpretation - is dependent on a particular understanding of 
that relation. 
13. Pp. 1 12-14. Here Alexander and Sherwin engage summarily Saul Kripke's interpre­
tation of Ludwig Wittgenstein to make the point that we find determinacy "not in mental 
states alone, but in mental states coupled with skills learned as part of forms of life. " P. 114. 
14. "Under what we call the natural model of precedent, judges give prior decisions just 
the force they naturally would have in a full assessment of reasons for de«:ision . . . .  [T]he 
natural model describes the reasoning of morally motivated judges who are not constrained 
to follow decisions with which they disagree. " P. 137. 
15. "Unlike the natural model, the rule model is a model of authoritative precedent. . .. 
[J]udges are bound by rules announced in the opinions of prior judges. " P. 140. 
16. "Under the result model . . .  what is binding is not the rules established by past 
judges but the past judges' actual decisions. " P. 142. 
17. Recall that to determine how to interpret Lex's rules we need to know what the 
authority that constituted Lex.had in mind when it "let Lex decide. "  See supra note 12. 
18. Alexander and Sherwin engage principally Ronald Dworkin's LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) 
(especially chapters 6 & 7) and TA KING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978) (especially chapters 4, 6, 
& 7). 
2044 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 101:2037 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.19 decision as a means to come to 
terms with the "judicial technique of surveying the past decisions in an 
area of law and distilling a legal principle from those decisions that is 
not (necessarily) the stated ground for any of them" (p. 164). 
Alexander and Sherwin conclude, "the case for legal principles fails" 
(p. 168). That is a provocative conclusion and one at odds with a good 
deal of jurisprudential thought.20 
Finally, in .Part IV of their monograph, comprising Chapters Nine 
and Ten, Alexander and Sherwin present their "account of the moral 
function of authoritative rules" (p. 183) and from the premises estab­
lished in that presentation engage several phases of the jurisprudential 
debate concerning the nature of legal theory from diverse perspec­
tives. Chapter Nine describes the relation between the Natural Law 
and Positivist perspectives as a tension between the Law's settlement 
function and morality. The two perspectives are, Alexander and 
Sherwin conclude, more complementary than opposed. The Chapter 
treats as well the inclusive/exclusive positivism "conflict. "21 Chapter 
Ten applies Alexander and Sherwin 's conception of rules' settlement 
function to persistent, jurisprudential questions: pathological legal 
systems, the obligation to obey Law, and the objectivity and determi­
nateness of Law. 
19. 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Alexander and Sherwin conclude that Judge Cardozo "pur­
ported to derive his principle from the extant law, not from morality. " P. 165. That may not 
be a fair reading of MacPherson or of Cardozo's method. It may be that Cardozo read the 
precedents as indicative of all the morality Cardozo needed. That is, we cannot know that 
Cardozo divorced the Law from morality in the way Alexander and Sherwin impute to him 
unless we could know that Cardozo chose legal principles over moral principles. Cardozo's 
reference to the "law" as the source of Buick's obligation should not be read to confirm so 
certainly Cardozo's inattention to morality; it may have been nothing more than a rhetorical 
flourish. The foregoing may only be a quibble with Alexander and Sherwin, but it does re­
mind that Law could encompass legal as well as moral principles, and contemplate their in­
terrelation too. Indeed, it would be difficult for students of the contract Law familiar with 
Cardozo's opinions in, for example, Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 
159 N.E. 173 (1927), and Wood v. Lucy, Lady DuffGordon, 118 N.E. 214 (1917), to con­
clude that those decisions betray a slavish preoccupation with following legal rather than 
moral principles. Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (1928), 
would provoke the same skepticism. I am indebted to Kelli A. Akes for that observation. 
20. The Colloquy issue of the Iowa Law Review devoted to Larry Alexander and Ken 
Kress's article Against Legal Principles, 82 IOWA L. REV. 739 (1997), includes seven schol­
ars' responses (Stephen R. Perry, Gerald J. Postema, Jeremy Waldron, Michael S. Moore, 
Gary Lawson, Brian Leiter, and Frederick Schauer) as well as Alexander and Kress's re­
sponse to the responses. Suffice it to say, though, that if Alexander and Sherwin are right 
about legal principles, the way Law is taught in American law schools may be wrong, or, at 
least, morally deficient. 
21. See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A 
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 103-19 (2001); Stephen R. Perry, Method and 
Principle in Legal Theory, 111 YALE L.J. 1757 (2002). 
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II. RULES IN Focus 
The soul of Alexander and Sherwin's thesis is presented in Chapter 
Four: "The Problem of Rules." In the preface, the authors acknowl­
edge that Chapter Four "is perhaps the most important chapter" of 
the book, "for it asks at the deepest level whether and under what 
conditions the settlement function is possible" (p. 4). The impossibility 
of the settlement function, if there is such, would be the impossibility 
of Law22 that would result from its being morally "right to issue 
authoritative rules but sometimes [morally] wrong to follow them."23 
The tension between morality and rules - the fundamental tension of 
contemporary, analytical jurisprudence - is thereby put at the center 
of Rules's argument. 
Given the place of that tension in the scheme of Rules, and, indeed 
the place of that tension in the jurisprudence generally, a great deal 
may be gleaned about the accomplishments and disappointments of 
legal theory once we come to terms with the rules-morality dynamic. 
Alexander and Sherwin discover a paradox in the rules-morality 
relation and respond to other.scholars' treatment of the paradox. This 
Part of the Review examines the paradox, and Alexander and 
Sherwin's presentation of it in Chapter Four, in order to pose 
questions that would inform appraisal of contemporary, analytical 
jurisprudence, and Rules's place in it. 
Is inductive legal reasoning based on arguments by analogy and 
legal precedent tenable? Alexander and Sherwin would say, generally, 
"no." But their conclusion is a product of their conception of morality, 
not a morality, but the nature of the morality metric itself - the type 
of human endeavor moral "reasoning," perhaps a misnomer, may be. 
Rules function "to translate moral principles into a set of direc­
tions that can be understood by people who previously disagreed or 
were uncertain about the meanfo.g of those principles. "24 While that 
reduces moral costs (of expertise, coordination, and inefficient delib­
eration (p. 26)), something is obscured, if not altogether lost, in the 
22. See Alexander, Formalism in Law and Morality, supra note 2, at 565: "The concept 
of law is bound up with the existence of formal rules. Surely the benefits of law are synony­
mous with the benefits of formal rules. If that is the case, then the impossibility of formal 
rules means in the most important sense the impossibility of law." 
23. Id. 
24. P. 54. 
Thus, if men were gods - morally omniscient - but not angels, morality would be an in­
adequate guide to behavior and posited norms would be unnecessary. If, however, men were 
angels but not gods, then posited norms in the form of determinate rules would be necessary 
to implement morality. Formalistic law is a solution to a cognitive, not a motivational, prob­
lem. 
P. 232 n.4. Alexander and Sherwin at that juncture cite Gregory S. Kavka, Why Even Mor­
ally Perfect People Would Need Government, 12 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 1 (1995). 
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translation. Alexander and Sherwin describe that something as the 
"gap" between the justification for and instantiation of a rule: 
Lacking omniscience, Lex cannot anticipate all future problems that will 
meet the concrete conditions stated in the rule; and if he could do this, 
the rule would be far too complex for practical application. Lex's rules, 
therefore, will sometimes dictate the wrong result. . . .  In other words, a 
"gap" lies between what Lex has reason to prescribe (and his subjects 
have reason to want him to prescribe) and what his subjects have reason 
to do, all things considered. (p. 54) 
Nonetheless rules make sense - perhaps even moral sense - because 
they facilitate authoritative settlement, the crucial function of Law. 
Moral practicality notwithstanding, Alexander and Sherwin's con­
clusion and despair that the gap cannot be closed or meaningfully 
diminished inform their reaction to fundamental questions of legal 
theory. In fact, their discovery of the gap is redolent of tautology, but 
not in a pejorative sense because tautology has analytic, pedagogic 
value. Consider: morality, any particular morality or just the idea of 
morality, contemplates a data set. That set must be fixed, or at least 
the nature of its constituents must be fixable, for otherwise there could 
be no basis for elaboration or translation of that moral data into the 
form of a rule. A rule is a heuristic device - it translates moral princi­
ples into "a compressed package of information, applicable to many 
cases."25 But a "serious"26 rule is also more than just a heuristic device. 
By sanction or otherwise it orders behavior, thereby changing the 
moral calculus. 
For a typical and accessible example, if a rule provides that you 
may not swim after sundown when there is no lifeguard present, 
should you decide to swim after sundown when there is not a lifeguard 
present you will have violated the rule and will be subject to sanctions 
therefor. The justification for the rule - say, safety or full employ­
ment of lifeguards - may be overcome by the particular instantiation 
that provokes contravention of the rule: the subject's efforts to save 
a drowning child. The moral thing to do may be to disobey the rule 
25. See MURRAY GELL-MANN, THE QUARK AND THE JAGUAR 77 (1994) (discussing 
"theory "). 
26. In their own words, Alexander and Sherman state: 
Our focus is on rules that are practical (prescriptive) norms and thus can be obeyed or vio­
lated, what we call "serious rules. " Serious rules contain a factual predicate or hypothesis 
and a prescription . . . .  The most important characteristic of a rule, as we use the term, is that 
it purports to state a prescription applicable to every case that falls within the rule's factual 
predicate or hypothesis. 
P. 27. 
Frederick Schauer captured the same idea: "We . . .  see rules as essentially frustrating, 
exercising their influence by getting in the way. They impede access to those facts that would 
otherwise, under a given theory of justification, be relevant to making the decision, and they 
interpose facts that would otherwise be irrelevant." SCHAUER, supra note 11, at 87. 
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and to swim to save the drowning child.27 That is the morality in the 
cleavage between justification and instantiation. That is the gap. 
Conceived in terms of that type of illustration, the fundamental (in 
the sense of "source") morality fixes a data set (a portion of which 
might be "do not go into the water unless the risk of misadventure is 
reduced by the presence of a lifeguard"; "go into the water if it is 
necessary to do so in order to save a life") and the rule fixes another, 
derivative data set (i.e. , "if it is after sundown, do not go into the water 
unless there is a lifeguard present"28). Following the rule generally 
saves moral cost;29 that is why the promulgation of rules provides a 
moral benefit. But that quantum of moral benefit may be overcome, in 
the particular instance, by the moral cost of permitting a child to 
drown.30 There is, in other terms, discontinuity between the morality 
and rule-data sets; there is morality in the cleavage and that morality 
in the event would overcome the moral gain of rule following. 
That conception of the rule-morality relationship and the descrip­
tion of the schemata constituents of rules and morality that it contem­
plates emerge from the Alexander and Sherwin exegesis. One means 
27. Is the actor's jumping in to save the child less moral than it would be if there were no 
prohibition on swimming? The fact that a direction takes the form of a rule would seem to 
enhance its moral content in a rule-following society because following rules is consistent 
with the object of Lex's promulgating them. But Alexander and Sherwin conclude, "consent 
or commitment to follow rules simply does not create a moral obligation to follow rules in 
particular cases. " P. 75. It is not clear, though, that that conclusion takes sufficient account of 
Alexander and Sherwin's arguments in favor of authoritative settlement. The reduction of 
coordination costs, and the gains from efficiency and Lex's expertise are moral gains. So it 
would seem that participation in such a system, by following rules, would likewise be a moral 
gain. And if that is true, then consent or commitment to follow rules would seem to enhance 
morality, though. admittedly, the fact of consent would not "create a moral obligation. "  
28. See SCHAUER, supra note 11, at 53-54: 
(A] generalization serves to make a justification more specific, or more concrete, in the same 
way that the result of a calculation is more concrete or more specific than the formula indi­
cating the way in which the calculation is to be performed . . . .  Because generalizations apply 
and specify their justifications, I will at times refer to the generalization constituting a rule as 
the instantiation of that rule's background justification. 
The difference between justification and instantiation is the difference between the de­
tail of the morality and its elaboration as a rule. Gell-Mann has described a similar idea that 
physicists refer to as "coarse graining ": "[W]hen defining complexity it is always necessary to 
specify a level of detail up to which the system is described, with finer details being ignored. " 
GELL-MANN, supra note 25, at 29. Similarly, the acuity of a rule is a measure of its coarse 
graining vis-a-vis its justification. That analogy would support the application of complexity 
theory parallels to the rule-morality relation. See infra text accompanying note 64. 
29. Lex's appointment enhances morality because it achieves greater coordination and 
efficiency and provides the means to assure that the society's rules reflect Lex's expertise. 
Efficiency, coordination, and expertise are moral desiderata. 
30. This is similar to the tension between rule and act utilitarianism. Rule utilitarianism 
focuses on a "practice, rather than an isolated incident . . . .  Instead of asking whether hang­
ing this innocent man has good consequences it asks whether the practice of hanging the in­
nocent is beneficial. . . .  Thus in working out the application of the principle of utility gener­
ally desirable criteria should sometimes yield to individual judgment. " M.D.A. FREEMAN, 
LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 201 n.12 (7th ed. 2001). 
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to arrive at the conclusion that there is a gap - a normative disconti­
nuity - is to conceive of rules and morality as related though inde­
pendent and perhaps interdependent data sets. When Lex formulates 
the rule he does so by reference to the moral data. The rule, then, is 
formulated in terms of that data, but not all of it: it is the fact that 
rules, even serious rules, translate moral data into heuristic form, rule 
data, that assures something gets lost between justification (morality) 
and instantiation (rule): Keep in mind, though, that reliance on rules is 
in a sense moral even when their application vindicates the immoral 
result, because of the moral cost saved by rules' operation. 
The bulk of Alexander and Sherwin's crucial Chapter Four is 
devoted to responses to other theorists' efforts to manage the gap. For 
present purposes - determining whether understanding the rule­
morality tension in terms of parallel but discontinuous data sets 
accurately captures Alexander and Sherwin's theory - review of 
those responses is worthwhile insofar as it reveals· more, or confirms 
what we may already imagine, about the schemata of rules and moral­
ity. 
First, Alexander and Sherwin consider whether what Schauer 
termed "rule-sensitive particularism"31 responds to the gap paradox. 
When an actor takes into account the value of following rules 
gen-erally in deciding whether to follow a rule in the particular 
instance, he is a rule-sensitive particularist. And to him, 
Lex's rule "No swimming" represents Lex's opinion that it is probably a 
mistake to think one can safely swim. If Lex is credible on this point, his 
rule gives Leo some reason, though by no means a conclusive reason, to 
believe that he is in fact mistaken [if Leo thinks that he can swim safely 
under the circumstances]. Thus, while issuance of a rule does not narrow 
the objective gap between what' Lex has reason to demand and what his 
subjects have reason to do, it may bring their judgments closer together. 
(pp. 61-62) 
In this case, where the justification for the rule is based on Lex's 
superior information or expertise, "rule-sensitive particularism trans­
mutes serious rules into advisory rules of thumb" (p. 62). Such heuris­
tics, however, merely narrow the gap. They do not overcome it. 
The case is much the same when a rule solves a coordination rather 
than a superior information or expertise problem. A coordination rule 
"prescribes one of several equally attractive courses of action"; the 
prototypical example is the "drive on the right " rule of the road.32 
31. P. 61 (quoting SCHAUER, supra note 11, at 94-100). 
· 32. Pp. 62-63. That conception of the benefits of coordination is similar to the "network 
effect " in the economics literature. See STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, THE 
ECONOMICS OF QWERTY 54 (2002) ("The circumstance in which the net value of an action 
(consuming a good, subscribing to telephone service [, following rules?]) is affected by the 
number of agents taking equivalent actions will be called a network effect. Broadly defined, 
network effects are indeed pervasive."). 
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Alexander and Sherwin offer examples of different types of coordina­
tion rules,33 but all lead to the same conclusion: " [I]f everyone is and is 
known to be a rule-sensitive particularist, there is nothing left of 
serious rules about which particularists can be rule-sensitive. In a 
world of particularists, serious rules would be nothing more than rules 
ofthumb."34 And rules of thumb neither are the rules that Alexander 
and Sherwin care about, nor are they the rules that can tell us anything 
about the fit between Law and morality: The result of turning serious 
rules into rules of thumb is the evisceration of rules. Even in the case 
of mere coordination rules, Lex will have good moral reason to issue 
rules (i.e. , "the errors of noncompliance are likely to exceed the errors 
of compliance" (p. 67)) but his subjects will have good particularist­
moral reasons for not following them by basing their nonconformity 
on the moral cleavage. Such decisions in the gap undermine rules and, 
at the same time, intimate the impossibility of Law. 
Alexander and Sherwin next confront Schauer's reaction to the 
gap: what he terms "presumptive positivism."35 The difference 
between "rule-sensitive particularism" and "presumptive positivism" 
seems to be one of degree (and perhaps technique). Schauer's formu­
lation captures the continuum (though that was not his object): 
Presumptive positivism is a way of describing the interplay between a 
pedigreed subset of rules and the full (and nonpedigreeable) normative 
universe, such that the former is treated by certain decision-makers as 
presumptively controlling in this not-necessarily-epistemic sense of pre­
sumptive.[36] As a result, these decision-makers override a rule within the 
pedigreed subset not when they believe that the rule has produced an er­
roneous or suboptimal result in this case, no matter how well grounded 
that belief, but instead when, and only when, the reasons for overriding 
are perceived by the decision-maker to be particularly strong.37 
That is the formulation of presumptive positivism to which· Alexander 
and Sherwin respond. 
We must note at the outset that Schauer was offering a description 
of presumptive positivism and was not prescribing the perspective as a 
33. Pp. 63-65. The authors also offer as illustrations "Spray for ants on the first of May" 
and "No marking in books." Id. 
34. P. 65. That is because the coordination value of rules is lost once the certainty of 
coordination is lost. 
35. See SCHAUER, supra note 1 1 ,  a�· 202-05; see also Stephen R. Perry, Second-Order 
Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theory, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 966 (1989); Gerald J. 
Postema, Positivism, I Presume? .. . Comments on Schauer's "Rules and the Rule of Law," 
14 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 797, 809-22 (1991). 
36. Schauer distinguishes his sense of "presumptive" from the epistemic idea of a pre­
sumption that we are familiar with from the evidence Law: "We might prefer the norms 
emanating from one source to those emanating from another for epistemic reasons, but the 
same preference might instead emerge from any of a number of non-epistemic reasons for 
allocating jurisdiction in one way rather than another." SCHAUER, supra note 1 1 ,  at 204. 
37. Id. 
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means to overcome the gap.38 But at most that is a clarifying quibble 
that enjoins the reader not to blame Schauer the messenger. It is 
important to keep in mind, however, that an accurate description of 
the ways rules work in fact may be at odds with the logic behind some 
understanding of how rules should work given a particular conception 
of rules' relation to morality. The fact of that opposition would not 
establish a deficiency of the description; it may instead suggest a 
deficiency in the rule-morality conception. More on this later.39 
For now, though, Schauer's view of serious rules as a "subset" 
vis-a-vis the "full (and nonpedigreeable) normative universe" may be 
revealing. That depiction of the relationship between rules and their 
normative source - one the subset of the other - contemplates a 
comparison of the partial to the complete, or "full": The rule is a 
partial elaboration of a normative universe; reference to the full 
normative universe would entail costs (in coordination, expertise, and 
efficiency) that would overcome the moral benefit realized thereby. 
That understanding of the gap works well with Alexander and 
Sherwin's explanation of the deficiencies of presumptive positivism. 
Conceived as the source of an additional reason for acting in a manner 
consistent with a rule rather than as an irrebutable injunction to follow 
a rule, presumptive positivism does not solve the gap: " [A] presump­
tion in favor of rule-following is in fact an additional rule, which 
subjects may have [moral] reason to disobey" (p. 73). The gap is not 
eliminated; it is merely, at best, shifted. 
In his description of presumptive positivism, Schauer relies on 
Joseph Raz's understanding that rules provide exclusionary reasons 
for acting in one way rather than another;40 that is, rules preclude 
some actions because they are rules.41 Alexander and Sherwin engage 
Raz in order to demonstrate that conceiving of rules as exclusionary 
reasons does not solve the problem presented by the gap: "A rule [as a 
'second-order' reason] is derived from the same first-order reasons 
that normally would govern its subjects' decisions, but because 
subjects are likely to err, it preempts these first-order reasons and 
38. In addition to the fact that Schauer's definition of presumptive positivism begins 
with an acknowledgment that it "is a way of describing," immediately following the portion 
of his text excerpted above, Schauer also acknowledges that he "cannot . . .  prove the 
descriptive accuracy of presumptive positivism. " Id. (emphasis added). Also, the last 
sentence of the chapter that posits Schauer's thesis concludes: "I will . . .  conclude this chap­
ter only with the descriptive assertion that presumptive positivism may be the most accurate 
picture of the place of rules within many modern legal systems. " Id. (emphasis added). 
39. See infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text. 
40. See SCHAUER, supra note 11, at 88-93. 
41. See JOSEPH RAZ. PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 39 (1975) ("A second-order rea­
son is any reason to act for a reason or to refrain from acting for a reason. An exclusionary 
reason is a second-order reason to refrain from acting for some reason. "). Rules are exclu­
sionary reasons. 
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replaces them with the prescription of the rule" (p. 74). So rules, as 
second-order exclusionary reasons, are derived from the first-order, 
or moral, reasons if Alexander and Sherwin's construction of Raz 
is accurate - and we may assume it is for the present purpose of 
discovering Alexander and Sherwin's understanding of the rules­
morality relationship. 
Consistent with their appreciation of the gap heretofore, 
Alexander and Sherwin conclude that appreciating rules as "exclu­
sionary" reasons does not overcome the gap because what the rules 
exclude is some morality - the moral cleavage. Because rules and 
morality are, essentially and necessarily, not coextensive, Lex cannot 
formulate rules that exclude the moral calculus even if he can 
formulate rules that exclude reference to morality. The gap is not 
bridged by the pronouncement or even by the understanding42 that 
what the rule provides is the moral thing. For something to be a rule 
ab initio it m ust truncate morality. 
The fourth strategy for closing the gap considered by Alexander 
and Sherwin is sanctions. And what is interesting here is not so much 
the fact that sanctions do not close the gap, but the fact that the exis­
tence of sanctions changes the moral calculus. More particularly, the 
way sanctions change the moral calculus reveals something about the 
function of the interrelation between morality and rules. 
Consider : "[I]f we assume that at some point, a threat of punish­
ment assumes moral significance, either because punishment will 
cause grave harm to the actor or because it will cause indirect harm to 
others, then sanctions can tip the balance of reasons in favor of 
compliance with rules" (p. 77). Sanctions narrow the gap not so much 
by making rules more moral in their operation - arguably a good 
depiction of the first three strategies - as by changing the moral 
foundation of which the rules are an elaboration. That sense emerges 
particularly from Alexander and Sherwin's appreciation of the situa­
tion faced and presented by the strict-moral judge.43 
The strict-moral judge will impose sanctions only when an actor 
has acted immorally. So if the actor swims after sundown when a 
lifeguard is not present but by doing so saves the life of a child, the 
42. Alexander and Sherwin also consider the argument that the gap would be eliminated 
were Lex's subjects understood to have consented to forego the reference to first-order 
reasons when they commit themselves to obey Lex's direction. The authors confirm that be­
cause you cannot assume a moral obligation to act immorally, any consent to follow second­
order reasons in place of their first-order antecedents would not overcome the moral 
dilemma. "[I]f it would otherwise be wrong to follow a rule in particular circumstances, prior 
consent or commitment does not change this conclusion." P. 75. 
43. Alexander and Sherwin also consider the reaction of the "rule-bound judge" and the 
"compassionate moral judge. " Pp. 78-79. The rule-bound judge would punish every violation 
of a rule. The compassionate-moral judge would only punish those rule breakers who acted 
culpably. So the compassionate-moral judge would not punish a rule breaker who reasona­
bly believed he was acting morally. 
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judge will not punish the actor. To make the illustration more salient, 
put values on the behavior - a scale of 1 to 100 works well. The rule 
against swimming after sundown without a lifeguard present is 
designed to avoid behavior that would score below 50 on that morality 
scale. While there may be advantages to swimming at any time, the 
combination of advantages and disadvantages generally totals no more 
than 49, taking into account the risk to the swimmer's life, the cost of 
trying to save the swimmer after dark, and the moral loss to the com­
munity if those who care about and perhaps even depend upon the 
swimmer are deprived of the swimmer's support and company. The 
rule against swimming after sundown when there is not a lifeguard 
present represents Lex's judgment that the behavior it proscribes 
could yield no more than a 49. We know that must be so once we 
decide, deus ex machina, that the rule is designed to proscribe behav­
ior valued at less than 50.44 
Next imagine that Lex's subject breaks the rule in order to save 
a drowning child. In that case, the proscribed activity would have 
a value approaching perhaps 100.45 We can give that activity the 
hypothetical value of 90. The strict-moral judge would not impose a 
sanction on account of the actor's having violated the swimming 
restriction. We would not want to discourage behavior that results in 
greater moral benefit than rule following (which surely would be 
valued at less than the life of a child but would not be valueless, would 
it?46). But once the strict-moral judge refuses to impose a sanction, the 
moral firmament shifts: " [The strict-moral judge] must . . .  consider the 
impact of her decision on the overall effectiveness of the rule . . . .  
[T]he effect of one judge's leniency on the value of a rule depends on 
the practice of other judges" (pp. 81-82). Similarly, in the case of a 
rule-sensitive-moral judge:47 " [P]unishment can have a corrective func­
tion with respect to moral costs that follow from the example of an 
unpunished violation of rules: punishment can make morally right a 
violation that otherwise would be wrong because it would undermine 
the value of the rule."48 Individual and official actions in reference to 
44. The measure of the rule on the morality scale would be determined by reference to 
its constituents' continuity with morality, whatever moral systems (or system) provide(s) the 
source of the rule's constituents. That relationship between the rules and the source of their 
constituents will reveal something about both what we mean to signify when we use the term 
"morality" and how that conception operates in the authoritative settlement calculus. 
45. It would certainly be less than 100 because we know that we make social choices that 
result in children drowning, e.g. , we do not outlaw swimming pools in neighborhoods where 
there are children present. 
46. See supra note 27 with regard to the moral value of rule following qua rule follow­
ing. 
47. P. 81 . Note that a strict-moral judge may also be a rule-sensitive particularist. 
48. P. 83. 
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rules change the moral calculus. There is an "echo" or "feedback" 
effect.49 
Using the hypothetical values offered above, a judge's decision not 
to impose a sanction impairs the seriousness of the rule. The rule no 
longer controls behavior in the same way it did before the judge's 
decision not to impose the sanction. If A violates a rule and is not 
punished therefor, the rule will have less deterrent effect than Lex 
intended. That is true even if A was morally correct not to follow the 
rule; that is, A's action was within the moral cleavage - the rule was 
either over- or under-inclusive (in the particular instance) in relation 
to the moral principle of which it was an elaboration. A rule originally 
designed to proscribe behavior valued at less than 50 will now, 
perhaps, only effectively proscribe behavior valued at less than 45.50 So 
Id. 
In a certain range of cases, rule-sensitive-moral adjudication also suffers from an internal 
paradox. The reason for this is that punishment can have a corrective function with respect 
to moral costs that follow from the example of an unpunished violation of rules: punishment 
can make morally right a violation that otherwise would be wrong because it would under­
mine the value of the rule. For example, suppose [Judge] Heidi is presiding over the case of 
Stephen, who was apprehended marking in a library book. She reaches an initial conclusion 
that Stephen's act was justified: despite a rule, "No marking in books," and a general prac­
tice of compliance with the rule, his reasons for marking outweigh the harm to future readers 
- though not by much. Then Heidi recalculates, taking into account the effect that Ste­
phen's example and her own decision not to punish Stephen may have on others, including 
both rule-subjects and other judges. This tips the scales, so that Stephen's act now appears to 
have been unjustified. Heidi is now inclined to punish. But if she imposes sanctions on Ste­
phen in a public decision, these sanctions will eliminate the exemplary effects of both his act 
and her own leniency. The act is once again a justified act. 
That proof is clever. And it also goes a long way to reveal the nature of Alexander and 
Sherwin's sense of morality. Recall that the subtitle of The Rule of Rules is "The Dilemmas 
of Law." Yet absent from their proof is any consideration of the consensus and perception 
dilemmas that would undermine their conclusion in anything approaching a real world - a 
world where morality may not usefully be conceived as a fixed or fixable data set. For a dis­
cussion of the consensus and perception dilemmas, see Peter A. Akes, Contract Recon­
ceived, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 39, 49-50 (2001). Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to note that the 
authors appreciate the impact of decision publicity on rule following even if they do not ex­
amine the impact of decisions as well as their publicity on morality, the foundation of rules. 
49. Cf. GELL-MANN, supra note 25, at 17 (discussing the role of feedback in complex 
adaptive systems). 
50. See p. 82. 
Judges may err in calculating the effects of their decisions on the value of rules. In fact. er­
rors of this sort are particularly likely because, for a judge deciding a single case, the impact 
of the decision on the parties immediately involved will be more salient and "available" than 
remote effects on future actors. If errors of judgment exceed the errors that would result 
from strict adherence to the rule, moral adjudication may produce morally inferior decisions. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Alexander and Sherwin describe the foregoing result as a consequence of judges' errors 
in "calculating the effects of their decisions on the value of rules." Id. I am not so sure that 
morally inferior decisions would only result from such error. A strict-moral judge may be 
constrained to reach a decision that is moral in the particular case but will lead to immoral 
subsequent decisions. The tension is the familiar one between act and rule utilitarianism. See 
supra note 30. You cannot serve two masters simultaneously because the cost of morality 
today may be the possibility (even probability) of immorality (or less than optimum moral­
ity) tomorrow. Alexander and Sherwin may not resolve that tension; it may not be soluble. 
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moral decisions - those decisions made on the basis of moral princi­
ples rather than rules which are an elaboration of them - may 
actually increase the size of the gap in futuro even if they narrow the 
gap in the particular instance. The converse would be true as well. 
Fifth and finally, Alexander and Sherwin consider deception as a 
strategy to close the gap: Lex can deceive his subjects as to the way 
that rules correct moral conduct. The rule may be formulated in an 
imperative form not actually supported by its justification. For 
example, "No swimming" may suggest to subjects that swimming is 
never the moral choice (not even when it is the only way to save a 
drowning child). Lex may also deceive at the level of adjudication, 
leading subjects to believe that every contravention of a rule will entail 
imposition of a sanction. That does not mean that Lex 's judges will not 
in fact be lenient in the event, but assumes that the appearance they 
will not enhances effectiveness of the rule.51 
Alexander and Sherwin ultimately reject deception as an 
unqualifiedly effective strategy to redress the gap, finding "serious 
practical, political, and moral objections" to the strategy (p. 89). 
Perhaps most probative of the nature of morality, deception 
puts an end to discussion of the moral questions that lie behind the rules. 
For Lex, this can mean the loss of important resources. If Lex relies on 
public debate for information about the success of his rules and ideas 
about how they could be improved, less debate means less feedback. 
Loss of this information becomes a cost of authoritative settlement. (pp. 
89-90) 
Now if Lex and Lex's rules can be improved - become more moral by 
leaving less cleavage between instantiation and justification - as a 
result of that feedback, then either Lex was not the ultimate arbiter of 
rules and morality that we needed to assume he was ab initio, or he 
could not foresee the dynamic of the rule-morality fit. In either event, 
we may conclude that Lex necessarily lacks the omniscience to assure 
that his rules have not codified epistemic errors or errors of coordina-
Indeed, its insolubility may intimate the mercury-like nature of morality's substance: most 
elusive when you try to pick it up. 
Still, Alexander and Sherwin could argue that we need to compare the moral totals of 
(1) the value of the judge's abrogating the rule in a particular instance plus the cost of that 
abrogation on net morality in a future governed by that impaired (or at least changed) rule 
with (2) the cost of the judge's following the rule in the moral cleavage plus the value of that 
rule-following on net future morality. But it would seem curious to conclude that a judge 
who cannot foresee the future "errs " in any morally or even epistemically meaningful way, 
unless we measure judges in terms of their clairvoyance. 
51 . P. 88. This would be an instance of what Meir Dan-Cohen describes as "acoustic 
separation. "  See Meir Dan-Cohen. Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separa­
tion in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630-36 (1984). 
May 2003] The Unruliness of Rules 2055 
tion or expertise.52 And, of course, insofar as Lex's subjects would be 
no less (and indeed likely more) prone to epistemic error than would 
Lex, they may have erred when they decided that Lex was the 
optimum lawgiver. 
Once we admit the possibility of Lex's epistemic deficiencies, a 
point made by Brian Leiter may merit further attention. In his 
response to Larry Alexander and Ken Kress's argument in Against 
Legal Principles,53 Leiter concluded, summarily and at the outset of his 
response, " [t)he argument [in Against Legal Principles] seems to falter 
on the largely tacit, but false, assumption that there are no significant 
epistemic limitations on determining moral optimality."54 In their 
response, Alexander and Kress do not take Leiter up on that issue and 
it strikes me that Leiter captured, albeit perhaps too succinctly, the 
fundamental omission i n  Alexander and Kress's as well as Alexander 
and Sherwin's conception of the rules-morality dualism. The conclu­
sion of Alexander and Sherwin about the deficiencies of deception 
may in fact acknowledge the very falsity of the "assumption that there 
are no significant epistemic limitations on determining moral optimal­
ity. "55 That does not mean, however, that we have yet figured out the 
proper response to that epistemic limitation, or, for that matter, that 
we have yet described the nature of our response in fact. To get there, 
we need to better appreciate the unruliness of rules. 
III. THE SOURCE OF RULES' UNRULINESS 
Before we can reach reliable conclusions about the fit between 
rules and morality, we must agree about what we intend to flow from 
those conclusions. If the object is to identify a discontinuity between 
rules and morality, that tautology may do no more than prove what it 
assumes: Rules, in order to be rules, must constrain morality. A system 
of rules, then, could not be moral, and Law as a moral system is 
impossible. That, in far too summary a fashion, is the conclusion of 
The Rule of Rules. But the power of the book, particularly in what it 
intimates about analytical jurisprudence generally and positivism 
particularly, goes beyond syllogism to reveal the limits of the concep­
tion of the rules-morality dynamic that has endured at least since 
Aristotle, and which has attracted so much attention since Hart. 
The fundamental deficiency of the familiar positivist conception is 
only revealed in full relief once Alexander and Sherwin demonstrate 
52. Alexander and Sherwin only assumed that Lex was chosen by his subjects to be the 
lawgiver because he has "proven in the past to possess the reasoning ability and the knowl­
edge to resolve moral controversies well." P. 16. Admittedly, they never said he was perfect. 
53. See supra note 20. 
54. Brian Leiter, Explanation and Legal Theory, 82 IOWA L. REV. 905, 905 (1997). 
55. Id. 
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the limits of understanding rules as an incomplete elaboration of 
morality and, concomitantly, morality as the full elaboration of rules. 
Morality so conceived fails as morality. So we need to refocus and 
Alexander and Sherwin help us do that, though they do not do it for 
us. A reconception could proceed along lines that reappraise not the 
content of morality in relation to the content of rules, but the nature 
of the metric or function that fixes the rules-morality relation. 
Once we conceive of the morality that is the source of rules, in 
some way, as a data set,56 the object of Law is to formulate rules - a 
corresponding data set - that are an elaboration of the moral data 
set. The only difference between the fundamental-moral data set and 
its elaboration in the rules data set are the instrumental benefits of 
efficiency, expertise, and coordination: the "value added" Lex pro­
vides. There is nothing else, according to Alexander and Sherwin. 
What emerges from that simple depiction is, the authors reveal, too 
simplistic. The consequence of our acknowledging the rules-morality 
relation in that way is the moral - if not practical - impossibility of 
Law. 
What Alexander and Sherwin compel us to do is to find another 
explanation of the fit between rules and morality, or, more accurately, 
another way to conceive of the intervening metric or function. We may 
draw upon analogies,57 and while they may not be new conceptual 
paradigms, their application to Law may be a worthwhile innovation. 
Prerequisite to appreciating those sources of analogy is an investiga­
tion of some of the ways that morality may defy formulation in rules. 
That is, once the rules-morality relationship is reconceived, the 
problem identified by Alexander and Sherwin may no longer be a 
problem. So their premises may be assailable. The following list of 
alternative conceptions is illustrative only and not intended to suggest 
a comprehensive catalog of perspectives. 
1. Morality, or at least our perception of it, may be dynamic. That 
is, it may change over time both from the individual and the corporate 
(meaning "group") perspective. By acknowledging that possibility we 
are not concluding that slavery or National Socialism ever were moral; 
all we need understand is that morality becomes clearer to us as 
our social institutions evolve.58 That may but need not contemplate a 
teleology of morality or moral awareness.59 
56 . Here we must be clear that we are not endorsing, and Alexander and Sherwin are 
not endorsing, any particular morality. They are concerned with the fit between rules and 
morality, not with the bases to posit a morality. The focus on comparing the rules-morality 
data sets as related data sets supports that agnosticism about the content of our morality. 
57. See infra text accompanying notes 58-66. 
58. "[E)specially as the temporal gap between law-making and law-application widens, 
the normative consensus that once endorsed the originally understood meaning of a consti­
tutional provision may weaken or even dissipate completely, and the factual or normative 
predicates may be altered." Fallon, supra note 10, at 45; see also CHARLES FREEMAN, 
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2. Morality may describe a predisposition, in the sense of a 
perspective, rather than a data set. So conceived, there may be as 
many moralities as there are self-conscious beings on the planet. But 
this is not to adopt relativism;60 it is only to acknowledge that there is 
sufficient dissonance in the constituents of morality (including the 
likes of intelligence and perceptual acuity) so that it makes more sense 
to understand morality as the product of perception and consensus 
dilemmas (confusions) than it does to understand morality as fixed 
and determinate for purposes of measuring actions or rules by refer­
ence to morality.61 
3. Morality may be the function of rules to no less an extent than 
rules are a function of morality. So when we enact rules we may 
determine morality by changing the norm calculus.62 By the same 
token, when we act in accordance with rules, we may impact the social 
acceptability of both the action and the rule in ways that influence the 
content of what we deem morality. Alexander and Sherwin seem to 
acknowledge this.63 
4. The relationship between rules and morality may otherwise not 
be linear, by which I mean that a change in morality may not register 
in any predictable way as a change in rules;64 And if that is true then it 
EGYPT, GREECE AND ROME: CIVILIZATIONS OF THE ANCIENT MEDITERRANEAN 12 (1996) 
(evolution of ancient Greek thought on sex crimes); STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE 
MISMEASURE OF MAN (1996) (debunking "scientific" theories of genetic difference). Both 
Freeman and Gould demonstrate the relationship between scientific understanding and 
moral positions. 
59. Hegelian and Habermasian historicism may supply a worthwhile model or basis of 
analogy here. See G.W.F. HEGEL, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (Leo 
Rauch trans., 1988); JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (Wiliam Rehg trans., 1996). 
60. I understand "relativism" in the sense that term is explored in chapter two of HURD, 
supra note 8, and Heidi Margaret Hurd, Note, Relativistic Jurisprudence: Skepticism 
Founded on Confusion, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1417 (1988). Because of space limitations, the 
consequences of Dean Hurd's conclusions for the argument of this Review could not be 
treated here. But it may suffice, for present purposes, to suggest that her definition of "rela­
tivism" addresses morality after allowing for the possible intellectual and perspectival dis­
continuities noted in the accompanying text. I would agree with much of her argument once 
we control for such discontinuities, that is, "all things considered." Joseph Boyle captures 
this sense with regard to "virtue ethics": "Since the character traits valued as virtues vary 
across communities of people, the universalism of ethical theory is avoided without an ap­
parent implication of relativistic subjectivism." Joseph Boyle, Natural Law and the Ethics of 
Traditions, in NATURAL LAW THEORY, supra note 4, at 3 .  
61. What I intend to suggest here is something in the nature of Nietzschean perspecti­
valism. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL (Walter Kaufmann trans., 
Vintage Books 1966) (1886); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 
(Walter Kaufmann ed., Walter Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1989) 
(1887). 
62. See generally McAdams, supra note 11 .  
63. See supra notes 43-49. 
64. What I mean to imply here is that the relationship between rules and morality may 
be "complex," in the technical sense, and therefore subject to the same type of vicissitudes as 
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undermines our ability to understand rules as an elaboration of 
morality, because we may have no way to discern or even identify 
morality through rules. 
5. Morality may represent, vis-a-vis rules, the striving, or the 
rapprochement from certain though elusive fundamental principles to 
rules in the sense of, for example, the likes of Kantian maxims.65 In 
which case the focus might better be on the element of striving - an 
Aristotelian conception - rather than the ultimate similarity of the 
rules-morality data sets. 
6. Morality may be the type of thing that we cannot formulate 
meaningfully for purposes of appreciating the rules-morality fit 
because we cannot achieve sufficient remove from our subjective 
perspective to glimpse it. It may be a phenomenon that we cannot get 
out sufficiently of our human condition to perceive.66 
What must not be lost though is the contribution of Rules: Impor­
tant rules-morality questions emerge from A lexander and Sherwin's 
study. These scholars show us, very clearly, the limits of our jurispru­
dence and they challenge us to look in areas - critical philosophy, 
language theory, complexity theses, and psychological insights - that 
have not yet been sufficiently exploited in the cause of analytical juris­
prudence. Alexander and Sherwin's study and · thesis force us to 
refocus on the constituents of the rules-morality relation. Just as you 
do not understand the chemical reaction by simply comparing the 
"before" and "after" of the involved elements, you do not understand 
the rules-morality dynamic in terms that can inform the resolution of 
important issues unless you appreciate the operation of the jurispru­
dential catalyst, if there is one. 
Alexander and Sherwin in their formulation of rules as an elabora­
tion of morality - a conclusion in line with analytical jurisprudence -
understand that the data set "rules" is derived from the substance 
"morality." That may be. But from that premise we need to under­
stand what happens in the translation process; how do the constituents 
those that concern complexity theorists in the economics literature. See, e.g., W. Brian 
Arthur, Path Dependence, Self-Reinforcement, and Human Learning, in INCREASING 
RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY 133 (1994). 
65. For a sense of Kantian maxims, see MANFRED KUEHN, KANT: A BIOGRAPHY 145 
(2001): 
Character is built on maxims . . . .  Kantian maxims are for the most part really ordinary sorts 
of things - at least in the way he described them in the context of anthropology. They are 
precepts or general policies that we have learned from others or from books, and that we 
choose to adopt as principles to live by. They show us to be rational creatures, or creatures 
who are capable of guiding their actions by general principles and not just impulse. Yet, and 
this is important, Kant did not think that they originate simply from our own reasoning. 
They are not primarily private principles but subjects of public discourse . . . .  Maxims, in a 
sense, are all around us; the question is which we should adopt. 
66. Quine may be some help here. See w.v. QUINE, ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND 
OTHER ESSAYS (1 969). 
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of morality become, in truncated form, the constituents of rules? That 
is the point on which we must focus: We must understand the morality 
metric or function or algorithm, the whatever it is that determines, 
whether or not on a predictable basis, the way the data-set morality 
gives rise to the data-set rules. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Alexander and Sherwin in The Rule of Rules describe the rules­
morality tension and the consequences for Law and the incidents of 
legal analysis and practice that flow from it. They reveal the funda­
mental incongruities in terms that are both accessible and sophisti­
cated. They fix the place of their critique in the jurisprudential 
firmament and reveal the limits of others' logic. Conscientious readers 
will generally follow with nodding approval. 
To appreciate the contribution that Alexander and Sherwin have 
made to the literature, though, we will need to appreciate w hat their 
exposition and analysis tells us about the rules-morality relation. 
Understood as a matter of communication, that is a communication 
between morality and the rules that will be an elaboration of that 
morality, the impossibility of Law is ultimately a failure of communi­
cation or at least our failure to understand the incidents of that 
communication in terms that would inform our better understanding 
of what Law can be. So the next step is ours: Alexander and Sherwin 
have taken us to the precipice. 
